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The phrase “duty of care” is, at best, too vague and, at
worst, ethically dangerous. The nature and scope of the
duty need to be determined, and conflicting duties must be
recognized and acknowledged. Duty of care is neither fixed
nor absolute but heavily dependent on context. The normal
risk level of the working environment, the healthcare work-
er’s specialty, the likely harm and benefits of treatment, and
the competing obligations deriving from the worker’s multi-
ple roles will all influence the limits of the duty of care. As
experts anticipate the arrival of an avian influenza pandem-
ic in humans, discussion of this matter is urgently needed.
E
pidemiologists are warning against an impending pan-
demic of avian influenza that could kill several million
people (1). This possibility raises an urgent and thorny eth-
ical question: Are healthcare professionals obligated to
care for patients during virulent epidemics of infectious
disease?
Duty of Care
Duty of care, in the medical context, is often invoked as
a sort of quasi-biblical commandment, akin to “do not lie”
or “do not murder.” In a document submitted to the Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Expert Panel
Secretariat, Godkin and Markwell suggest that policy
guidelines on the duty of care (which they term duty to
care) should state that healthcare professionals’ duty to
care extends to a public health emergency in outbreak con-
ditions (2). The authors however suggest that healthcare
employers have a set of reciprocal responsibilities toward
their staffs, which include duties to inform, protect, and
support healthcare personnel. Singer et al., in an article on
the ethical issues raised by SARS in Toronto, briefly dis-
cuss the duty to care before concluding that the 9 authors
“could not reach consensus on the issue of duty of care,
particularly regarding the extent to which healthcare work-
ers are obligated to risk their lives in delivering clinical
care” (3). The term “duty of care” (which I take to be syn-
onymous with duty to care) is, at best, too vague and, at
worst, ethically dangerous. For these reasons, the phrase
should be modified in favor of more specific descriptions
of the obligations of healthcare workers.
Special Obligation of Doctors to Benefit 
Their Patients
By virtue of their profession, doctors and nurses have
more stringent obligations of beneficence than most. They
have obligations to a specified group of persons (their
patients) that nonmedical personnel have no obligation to
help. The term “duty of care” refers to these special obli-
gations. In its bare form, however, the phrase gives no
indication of the precise nature of the duty, nor of its lim-
its. Its definitional vagueness, combined with its rhetorical
appeal, may be used to justify actions without the need for
rational deliberation. During the SARS outbreaks in
Toronto, the phrase was often used as a self-standing argu-
ment for active involvement on the part of medical staff,
without any critical examination of its meaning. Used in
this manner, the term may become a subtle instrument of
intimidation, pressuring healthcare workers into working
in circumstances that they consider morally, psychologi-
cally, or physically unacceptable. The phrase duty of care
can thus be ethically dangerous by giving the illusion of
legitimate moral justification.
To be of any use, the phrase needs to be fleshed out. Are
there limits to the duty? Should doctors do everything in
their power to benefit their patients? The answer, surely, is
no. Doctors are under no moral obligation to donate one of
their kidneys to one of their patients, for example. They
may, of course, choose to do so, but their act would exceed
the demands of everyday morality. What distinguishes nor-
mal duty from acting beyond the call of duty, however, is
not always clear-cut; the boundary between the 2 cate-
gories is fuzzy (4).
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Defining the limits of the duty of care is a daunting
task, strewn with philosophical and logistical difficulties.
As the example of the kidney-giving doctors shows, the
duty is not absolute but, rather, constrained by several
factors. First, the limits of the duty should be a function of
the normal risk level. A doctor practicing in Kinshasa,
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), for instance, is
going to incur more risk than a doctor in rural Dorset,
England. The diseases are many and the facilities few in
DRC. Every nurse or doctor, by accepting a post, is usual-
ly aware of the perils of treating infected patients. The
appearance of an exotic, highly virulent disease, however,
challenges healthcare workers to question their interpreta-
tion of the duty of care, in particular, its limits. This chal-
lenge was apparent both in the HIV/AIDS epidemics of the
1980s in the United States and in the 2003 SARS out-
breaks in Toronto, in which doctors and nurses refused to
treat afflicted patients on the grounds that they presented
too great a danger (2,5). This phenomenon is also likely to
occur if the anticipated avian influenza epidemic affects
Western hospitals. In light of these historical precedents,
hospitals may want to inform prospective staff members of
what is expected in crisis situations before, rather than in
the midst of, an emergency. By using comparisons and sta-
tistics, hospitals could indicate the sorts of risks healthcare
staff are expected to handle.
Another factor in defining acceptable risk levels relates
to the healthcare worker’s specialty. Within the same hos-
pital, an emergency care physician, as a first responder to
many critically ill or injured persons, is obviously more at
risk than, for example, a dermatologist. By entering into a
specialty, doctors implicitly consent to a range of risks and
responsibilities associated with the job. The outer limit of
acceptable personal risk will fall further along the contin-
uum of risk for some specialists (e.g., infectious disease
physicians) than for others (e.g., dermatologists or
rheumatologists). During the SARS outbreaks in Toronto,
the persons most at risk were nurses and infectious dis-
eases (ID) specialists. As a result of their specialist train-
ing, they may have felt a stronger obligation to participate
than doctors in other areas of medicine. 
Doctors as Multiple Agents
Doctors, although they belong to their own profession-
al community and adhere to its set of rules, are also part of
the broader community and therefore subject to the same
rights and duties as other members. The 2 spheres of obli-
gation, professional and personal, are both separate and
overlapping. They are separate in that the obligations of
doctors toward their patients give them rights that nonmed-
ical members of the society do not possess, such as open-
ing someone’s abdomen to remove an appendix. The
spheres are overlapping, however, in that their role as doc-
tors does not completely absolve their responsibilities as
members of the broader community. The immunity from
sanction is specific, not general. Agynecologist may legit-
imately examine intimate parts of his or her patient but
cannot drive beyond the speed limit or steal apples from
the market stall. With the acquisition of additional duties
and rights conferred by the profession, the doctor also
agrees to relinquish certain rights enjoyed by others. By
entering into the profession, a doctor agrees not only to
abide by new rules but also to accept dangers that would
be unacceptable to many (e.g., performing a delicate, inva-
sive procedure on a patient with hepatitis or HIV/AIDS).
In times of crisis, the duties deriving from doctors’mul-
tiple roles may come into conflict. Doctors, for instance,
may have a duty to care for their SARS or avian influen-
za–infected patients as well as a duty to care for their own
children by protecting them (and hence themselves) from
infection. So a further problem with the duty to care, aside
from its vagueness, is that it fails to consider the holder of
the duty as a multiple agent belonging to a broader com-
munity. Doctors, in such situations, play several incompat-
ible roles—doctor, spouse, parent, for example—and they
must deal with them as best they can. The limits of the duty
of care are thus also defined by the strengths of competing
rights and duties.
Virtues of Patients and Their Duty of Care
Whereas much has been written on what makes a good
doctor, scant attention has been devoted to the good patient
(6,7). Pellegrino and Thomasma, in For the Patient’s Good,
devote a chapter to the “good patient” (8). “Patients,” they
write, “must relate to physicians in all of the virtuous ways
that govern human interrelationships and social conduct”
(8). The authors identify 4 key virtues for the good patient:
truthfulness, compliance, tolerance, and trust. The virtue
most pertinent to this discussion is tolerance. In their
examination of tolerance, Pellegrino and Thomasma men-
tion the patients’ need to understand the limitations and
fallibility of medicine and to care for the well-being of
their fellow patients (8).
The virtue of tolerance should also require patients to
acknowledge healthcare workers’plurality of roles, as well
as their fears and concerns in the face of severe risk. If
these fears are well founded and reach such a level that
medical staff are worried for their life or that of their loved
ones, the virtuous patient ought to allow them to step down
from their role as caregivers. In such cases, insisting that
they continue in this role would reflect a lack of compas-
sion and understanding. Patients should be entitled to ask
for a replacement who is less anxious or prone to panic, but
they cannot force other persons to undergo extreme stress
against their wishes.
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in Kikwit (DRC), he found 30 dying patients in an aban-
doned hospital, left to care for themselves amid rotting
corpses, sometimes in the same bed (9). Was the last doc-
tor justified in leaving the patients, or should he or she
have been obliged to single-handedly treat the highly and
dangerously infectious Ebola patients? The answer
depends, at least in part, on the actual risk to the doctor and
the potential benefits (including the alleviation of pain and
distress) that his or her presence will bring to the patients.
If the actual risk for serious illness or death for the doctor
is low and the benefits of treatment substantial, then he or
she may have an obligation to remain. If, however, the lack
of protective equipment means that the chances of infec-
tion are high and no, or trivially small, benefits will result
for the patients (as is often the case with Ebola), then the
doctor may justifiably abandon the doomed patients.
Virtuous patients, aware of the high risk and the futility of
treatment, would not force a doctor to care for them in such
circumstances. Patients too have a duty to care for health-
care workers. Part of this duty is not to require doctors to
transcend the bounds of reasonable risk during treatment
and to respect and acknowledge their roles outside the
realm of medicine.
As potential participants in the drama and as holders of
a duty of care toward healthcare workers, the general pub-
lic also should be involved in setting limits to duty. Some
form of dialogue between the public and the medical pro-
fession, through the media, public consultations, and edu-
cational establishments, could help establish a mutually
acceptable set of limits.
Impact on Patient Trust
The justified abandonment of patients by doctors
arguably will result in the harm or even death of these
patients. Moreover, public trust in doctors will diminish as
persons realize that they, like the 30 forsaken Ebola
patients at Kikwit General Hospital, might be left on their
own as soon as the risk reaches a certain level. The patients
at Kikwit died alone, abandoned by both medical staff and
their own frightened relatives. So tragic is the situation that
it seems counterintuitive to justify the actions of the nurs-
es and doctors. Yet, before passing judgment, comparing
this situation with another hypothetical situation may be
useful.
If a swimmer in an isolated but supervised beach starts
to drown 50 meters from the shore, the lifeguard may rea-
sonably be expected to attempt a rescue. This, after all, is
the lifeguard’s duty as a qualified professional. If, howev-
er, the person is drowning 2 miles out and is surrounded by
a school of hungry, man-eating sharks, then one cannot
expect the solitary lifeguard to dive among the sharks to
save the swimmer, even if that means the swimmer will
certainly die and even if the lifeguard has a small chance
of saving him or her (at great personal risk).
The lifeguard cannot be criticized for not interfering,
even though his or her prima facie duty is to rescue drown-
ing persons. Likewise, the fact that doctors can, in excep-
tional circumstances, refuse to treat patients does not
necessarily entail a moral wrong, no matter how serious
the consequences to the abandoned patients. As long as
patients hold realistic expectations of the limits of doctors’
duty of care, no trust should be lost when these limits are
transgressed.
Urgent Need
In the last 20 years, various outbreaks of severe infec-
tious diseases, from Ebola virus infection to SARS, have
highlighted the need for a more precise account of the
duties and obligations of healthcare professionals. The
impending avian influenza epidemic makes such an
account urgent. The concept of duty of care, in its bare
form, is too vague to be helpful. Its limits are not fixed, but
contingent on various factors, from the working environ-
ment’s normal risk level to the healthcare worker’s special-
ty and the range of other obligations that derive from his or
her multiple roles. To clarify this overlooked topic, empir-
ical social science research should be conducted to illumi-
nate the views and reasoning of physicians, patients, and
members of the public on the limits of the duty of care.
Philosophical reflection on the issue as well would do
much to clarify this overlooked topic. As dramatic as it
may sound, delineating the limits of the duty of care may
prevent large numbers of doctors from abandoning their
patients in a crisis. Such abandonment has happened in the
past and may occur again.
In light of the potentially catastrophic impact of avian
influenza on human health and economic well-being, this
topic should engender a burst of activity and debate in hos-
pitals, universities, and medical journals. We should
explore not only the nebulous limits of the duty of care but
also infection control measures, staff training and involve-
ment, the role of medical students and volunteers, the triag-
ing of incoming patients, and the logistics of treatment,
depending on the severity of the epidemic, as well as the
lessons learned from past epidemics. However difficult the
task, these issues should best be tackled now, in times of
relative calm, rather than in times of pandemic turbulence.
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